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Women  are  under-represented  in many  top  jobs.  We  investigate  whether  biased  beliefs
about  female  ability  – a form  of  ‘mistake-based  discrimination’  –  are  partially  responsible
for  this  under-representation.  We  use  more  than  10 years  of data  on  the  performance  of
female jockeys  in  U.K.  and  Irish horse  racing  – a sport  where,  uniquely,  men  and  women
compete  side-by-side  –  to evaluate  the presence  of such  discrimination.  The  odds  produced
by the  betting  market  provide  a  window  onto  society’s  beliefs  about  the abilities  of  women
in a male-dominated  occupation.  We ﬁnd  that women  are  slightly  underestimated,  winning
0.3%  more  races  than  the  market  predicts.  Female  jockeys  are  underestimated  to a  greater
extent  in jump  racing,  where  their participation  is low.  We  discuss  possible  reasons  for  this
association.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Women  are under-represented in top-ranking positions across a range of professions: within business, within politics, and
within academia. This under-representation has been dubbed the ‘glass ceiling’, and has attracted interest from academics
(e.g. Bertrand and Hallock, 2001), policymakers,1 and the popular press.2 Furthermore, the absence of women  in high-ranking
positions coincides with a gender wage gap right across the wage distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2007).
Explanations for unequal outcomes for men  and women in the labour market are manifold. One explanation is that women
are reluctant to engage in competition. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that women  prefer piece-rate compensation,
rather than compensation determined by a competitive tournament. If the achievement of high ofﬁce – whether in business,
politics, or elsewhere – involves performing in competitive environments, the relative absence of women at this level could
be partially explained by female distaste for such competition.
Other prominent explanations can be categorised as discrimination. One example is taste-based discrimination (Becker,
1957), where discriminatory managers are willing to forgo some proﬁtability in return for a workplace predominantly
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1603 591131.
E-mail addresses: alasdair.brown@uea.ac.uk (A. Brown), fuyu.yang@uea.ac.uk (F. Yang).
1 For example, see the British government report on increasing female representation on corporate boards (www.gov.uk/government/policies/
making-companies-more-accountable-to-shareholders-and-the-public).
2 For example, see The Economist on the male-dominated world of central banking (www.economist.com/news/ﬁnance-and-economics/
21584386-unsteady-march-diversity).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.031
0167-2681/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
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omposed of men. Alternatively, such discrimination may  be statistical (Phelps, 1972), in that the decision to choose a male
mployee over an equally qualiﬁed female employee is due to unobserved factors in individual productivity, combined with
ifferences in the average productivity of men  and women.
In this paper we investigate an alternative form of discrimination. We  investigate whether society – for want of a better
ord, and intended to include both men  and women – systematically underestimates the skills and abilities of women.
erhaps many employers mistakenly believe that women  are not capable of carrying out high-powered jobs? Furthermore,
erhaps the absence of women in these roles accentuates this perception, as employers do not get the opportunity to learn
bout the abilities of women? Wolfers (2006) labelled this type of discrimination ‘mistake-based’.
To examine mistake-based discrimination, we  investigate the performance of female jockeys within U.K. and Irish horse
acing. This is the only major sport where men  and women  compete side-by-side in competition. Moreover, a betting
arket trades bets on the winner of each race. The betting market – and the odds it produces – therefore provides a unique
indow onto society’s beliefs about the skills and abilities of women  in a male-dominated occupation. If female jockeys are
ystematically underestimated, we can expect them to win more often than their odds imply, and ﬁnish races before their
ore heavily-favoured male competitors.
Importantly, our empirical strategy does not rely on the assumption that male and female jockeys are of equal ability, or
ndeed that they receive equal opportunities to ride the best horses. The analysis we present answers the simple question:
iven the hand that male and female jockeys have been dealt – both in terms of their individual ability, and that of their
orse – does the market systematically underestimate the skills and abilities of women?
Across more than 10 years of racing in the U.K. and Ireland, involving 123,704 races and more than 1.32 m competitors, we
nd that female jockeys are slightly underestimated; female jockeys are 0.3% more likely to win  races than betting market
rices predict.
This small effect, however, masks subtle differences across the sample. We  ﬁnd that female jockeys particularly outper-
orm expectations in the two forms of jump racing: over hurdles, and over the more arduous obstacles in steeplechases.
o be speciﬁc, female jockeys win 0.7% more hurdle races and 0.9% more steeplechases than the market predicts. Captured
nother way, female jockeys ﬁnish, on average, 0.3 places better than the market predicts in steeplechases and 0.54 places
etter in hurdles. Interestingly, female jockeys secure only 2.89% of the rides in steeplechases and 2.18% of rides in hurdle
aces, compared to 8.19% in all-weather ﬂat races, for example. In Section 5 we will discuss possible reasons why female
ockeys are underestimated in precisely the types of races where their participation is lowest.
Our paper is closest in spirit to those of Wolfers (2006) and Kolev (2012). Wolfers compared the stock returns of ﬁrms
ith a female CEO to those with a male CEO. If female CEOs are underestimated by ﬁnancial markets, we  would expect to
ccrue abnormal returns by holding the stock of ﬁrms with a female head. Wolfers actually found negative abnormal returns
f ﬁrms headed by a woman when compared to the returns of ﬁrms headed by a man, but the difference was  not statistically
igniﬁcant. This insigniﬁcance was predominantly ascribed to a lack of statistical power. In his sample there were only 64
emale CEOs, compared to 4175 male CEOs, and females only worked 1.3% of the CEO-years. Kolev (2012), however, showed
hat an alternative construction of the data, and alternative econometric techniques, yielded statistically signiﬁcant negative
bnormal returns for female-led ﬁrms. In the absence of an omitted risk-factor, or mispricing lasting beyond the length of
olev’s study, there is therefore evidence to suggest that females are, in fact, overestimated by stock market participants. If
hat is the case, erroneous beliefs regarding female ability are unlikely to be a driver behind the large discrepancy between
ale and female labour market outcomes.3
Our setting, however, offers advantages over the aforementioned stock market studies. Firstly, there is greater statistical
ower. We  have 1385 female jockeys in our sample out of a population of 6134. Although female jockeys secure fewer rides
han their male counterparts, they still obtain 4.75% of the approximately 1.32 m rides in our sample. A second advantage is
hat each jockey is not tied to any one horse in the way that a CEO is, at least temporarily, tied to one ﬁrm. Jockeys will ride
ifferent horses in the same day, and horses will also be ridden by different jockeys. We  can therefore more cleanly isolate
he ‘value-added’ by each jockey. Thirdly, while caution must be exerted in extrapolating observations from betting – an
ctivity with negative expected returns – betting market prices may  reﬂect the beliefs of a wider section of society. Stock
eturns are largely in the hands of institutional investors and money managers, while individuals ‘manage their own  money’
n betting markets. In 2011, the British Horse Racing Authority estimated that 6.1 m people attended a U.K. horse race, with
 substantial proportion placing bets.4 We  hope to garner a reﬂection of their beliefs about female ability by examining the
rices that result from these bets.Fourth, we can measure beliefs about male and female ability at different levels of an industry. While stock market prices
ay reﬂect beliefs about the abilities of the heads of large publicly-listed ﬁrms, betting markets can tell us about the public’s
erceptions of a wide range of competitors, from the elite practitioners in class 1 races, all the way down to the part-timers
3 There is a parallel literature that examines stock market reactions to the appointment of a female CEO. Lee and James (2007) ﬁnd a negative market
esponse, on average, to female appointments compared to male appointments. However, others have not found such a response when randomly selecting
omparator male CEOs appointment from the same industry (Gondhalekar and Dalmia, 2007), or when using matching on observables techniques (Martin
t  al., 2009). A review of this literature can be found in Mohan (2014). Our interest is in whether market beliefs are unbiased, rather than establishing the
ature of these beliefs (i.e. whether the market believes the appointment of a female is bad news or not). For this reason, our paper is more closely related
o  the work of Wolfers (2006) and Kolev (2012).
4 British Horse Racing Authority FactBook 2011/12.
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who compete in class 7, or undesignated, races. We can use this variation to see if discrimination exists to a lesser or greater
extent at the upper or lower echelons of the sport. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, betting market assets are ﬁnitely-
lived. Bets are traded, the race is run, and the fundamental value of each bet is revealed. If markets underestimate women,
therefore, female jockeys will simply win more races than their betting odds imply. This contrasts with stocks, which, in
principle, have an inﬁnite lifespan. If the stock market is wrong to believe that the appointment of a female CEO is bad news,
there is no speciﬁc time-frame in which the market’s error will be deﬁnitively revealed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we provide some background on the standard career progression
of a jockey, and look in particular at anthropological studies of women  in this role. In Section 3 we describe the institutional
features of betting in the U.K. and Ireland, and review the literature on betting market efﬁciency. In Section 4 we  present the
data, with the full analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The jockey
It is common for jockeys to begin their career in horse racing in the more mundane occupation of stable hand, or ‘lad’
as he or she is sometimes called. The stable hand will keep the trainer’s yard clean, exercise the horses, and help in the
preparation for races. From here, a promising jockey can hope to ride as an amateur, which requires a license, or ideally ride
as a trainer’s apprentice. When riding as an apprentice – or a ‘conditional’, as they are called in jump racing – the jockey
beneﬁts from a reduction in the weight they must carry in races. However, once the apprentice has won a certain number of
races, the allowance is dropped, and the jockey must compete with his or her professional peers on an equal footing. Once
professional, a jockey can ride exclusively for a large stable, as many of the elite jockeys do, or ride freelance for a number
of stables.
Even though women have held licences to ride since 1972 (Hargreaves, 1994), women  can be disproportionately found as
stable hands. Statistics from the British Horse Racing Authority indicate that women  held 41.6% of jobs within trainers’ yards
in 2011. However, only 17.11% of apprentice jockeys at the time were female, and even fewer females found themselves
within the professional jockey ranks.
Cassidy (2002) – in her anthropological study of life in Newmarket, the ‘HQ’ of horse racing – provides some insight into
reasons given (by males) for the lack of progression of females. Trainers assert that male stable hands are more ambitious,
and females more nurturing and conscientious in their work in the stable. Consider the following quote:
‘You know what lads are like, they want to be jockeys day and night, so we stick to girls, they really care about the horses and
do a good job’.
Roberts and MacLean (2012), in a discourse analysis, state that the limited opportunities for female jockeys are justiﬁed,
within the industry, on three grounds: physical strength, body shape, and tradition. One trainer in this study suggests that
they would always prefer a male jockey over jumps, primarily due to the physical strain, but that the choice was less clear
on the ﬂat:
‘I think Hayley Turner is as good as any guy riding; she rides a bit for me. There are a lot of good girls riding.’
Roberts and MacLean go on to suggest that while the prospects for women  in ﬂat racing may  improve (due to the
importance of being light), there is little chance of equal opportunities for women  in jump racing.
As mentioned earlier, the key feature of our empirical design is that we  do not have to evaluate the relative merits of male
and female jockeys, either in ﬂat racing or over jumps. Neither do we need to assume that males and females receive equal
opportunities to ride the strongest horses. (The discussion above suggests that they do not.) We  can control for both jockey
and horse ability, via the betting market odds, and ascertain whether female jockeys outperform these expectations. As a
result, we can establish whether betting markets – which are populated by bookmakers, owners, trainers, jockeys, stable
hands, and the betting public – hold skewed beliefs about female ability in a male-dominated environment.
3. Horse race betting
Punters in the U.K. and Ireland can bet on horse races in three main market structures. The ﬁrst of these is the Tote, a
pari-mutuel pool run until recently in the U.K. by the government, but now in the hands of a private operator. Tote Ireland is
owned by the country’s horse racing governing body. Pari-mutuel pools dominate wagering in the U.S. and Hong Kong, but
are slightly less popular in the U.K. and Ireland (in part due to the available alternatives that we will discuss). When placing
a bet in a pari-mutuel pool, the punter does not specify the price (or odds) at which they would like to trade. Instead the
bettor only speciﬁes the volume of their bet. Winnings bets are then funded from the money taken from all of the losing
bets, after the operator has removed the track-take. The track-take in the U.K. was  as low as 13.5% in 2003, but is now quoted
at 22%. The money paid to a punter holding a winning ticket is determined by the proportion of volume on that horse for
which he or she was responsible. The odds on each horse are declared when the market closes at the start of each race. The
more money that is placed on a horse, relative to the competition, the lower the ﬁnal odds and the lower the payout in the
case of a win.The second type of betting is facilitated by bookmakers. In contrast to pari-mutuel betting, bookmakers specify a price,
or odds, that they are willing to offer. These odds can be posted in bookmaker shops on high-streets throughout the country,
online, or on electronic boards with the on-course bookmakers. The volumes that can be traded at these odds are not speciﬁed,
and bookmakers may  refuse to take large bets for certain horses. Rather than proﬁting from the track-take, bookmakers’
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roﬁt margins stem from the ’over-round’; i.e. if you summed up the win  probabilities of all the horses in a race – implied by
he bookmaker’s odds – they would exceed 1. This allows bookmakers to, in expectation, make a small proﬁt on each race.
or our study, we use the Starting Price (SP), an average of on-course bookmaker prices at the time the race starts. These
dds should be the most informative bookmaker odds, as these bookies can observe the horses and conditions at closer
roximity than bookmakers located away from the racecourses. Indeed, many off-course bookmakers agree to settle bets at
he SP.
A third form of betting markets are the betting exchanges, the largest of which is Betfair in the U.K. Developed only in
he last decade and a half, the exchanges allow for individual punters to replicate the role of bookmakers. Modelled on the
tructure of ﬁnancial limit order books, bettors can back or lay horses. Laying a horse means betting that she or he will lose.
urthermore, these back and lay bets can be placed in the form of limit orders (or quotes for others to take the other side of
he bet), or market orders (executed at quotes already provided by others on the exchange).
There are two main differences between the Tote, on the one hand, and the bookmakers and betting exchanges on the
ther. The ﬁrst difference is that prices are not ﬁxed at the time a bet is placed with the Tote. Projected prices, based on volume
o far, are displayed on the screens prior to a race, but a large amount of money is typically wagered in the last few minutes,
eading to large, and late, price swings. Secondly, there is no intermediary in pari-mutuel betting. While bookmakers and
etting exchange participants set prices – which can account for volume if they think the volume is informative, or discount
rading volume if they think it is not – prices in the pari-mutuel pool are solely determined by volume. These differences
ave two potential implications. Firstly, pari-mutuel prices may  reﬂect the beliefs of bettors without the interjection of the
iews of a few bookmakers or liquidity providers on the exchanges. Secondly, if beliefs are biased against female jockeys, for
xample, the absence of accurate real-time price information means that it is problematic to arbitrage any discrimination
gainst female jockeys in pari-mutuel pools. In these two  senses, it would be interesting to use pari-mutuel prices to evaluate
ender discrimination in horse race betting. However, records of Tote prices are often patchy (particularly for those horses
hat did not win races), and are not available for such a long time-frame as the bookmaker SP we use in this study.
For many decades researchers have used betting market data to evaluate beliefs, risk-preferences, and market efﬁciency.
rom the early work of Grifﬁth (1949), researchers have typically noted a favourite-longshot bias, where the returns to
etting on favourites exceed those of betting on longshots. This bias has been found in pari-mutuel pools (e.g. Snyder, 1978,
mong many others), bookmaker markets (Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997), and the betting exchanges (Smith et al.,
006). Explanations range from the misestimation of win  probabilities (Grifﬁth, 1949), risk-loving behaviour (Weitzman,
965), heterogeneous beliefs (Ali, 1977) and adverse selection (Shin, 1993). For a survey of these explanations, see Ottaviani
nd Sørensen (2008). Ours is the ﬁrst study, to our knowledge, to evaluate mispricing of bets due to participant gender. At
he same time, we ﬁnd a slight negative favourite-longshot bias which, while rare, has been found in other well-developed
etting markets (e.g. Busche and Hall, 1988). In evaluating the presence of discrimination against female jockeys, we will
ttempt to rule out any confounding effect related to the favourite-longshot bias.
. Data
We  collected data on U.K. and Irish horse races from 1st January 2003 to the 7th September 2013 from Betwise, a betting
nformation company. This sample includes 123,704 races with just over 1.32 million runners. The database includes a series
f race variables, such as the date, time, location, class, type of race, and distance. Class is only applicable for U.K. races, and
uns from 1, the elite class, to 7. The majority of races are one of 5 types. The ﬁrst three of these are run on the ﬂat. These are (1)
ll-weather ﬂat races, which are run on synthetic ground, (2) (standard) ﬂat races, which are perhaps the most prestigious,
nd (3) national hunt ﬂat races, which are used to ease future jump horses into the practice of racing. The other two  major
ypes of races involve obstacles. These are (1) hurdle races, where the obstacles are relatively low, and (2) steeplechases,
hich involve more arduous obstacles. The Grand National, the most famous of the jump races, is a steeplechase.
Also included in our data are a number of horse-speciﬁc variables. These include the name of the horse, the name of
he jockey, and the starting price (SP) for each horse in each race. As discussed in Section 3, the starting price is an average
f on-course bookmaker odds at the time the race begins. The odds, which include the stake, range from 1.01 to 501. For
xample, a 1 GBP winning bet on a horse with an SP of 3 would lead to a payout of 3 GBP (including the return of the 1 GBP
take). The bettor would therefore have made a proﬁt of 2 GBP. If the horse loses, the 1 GBP stake is kept by the bookmaker.
Our next procedure is to identify the female jockeys within the sample. Most of the time, this is a simple task. Most female
ockeys are listed as a Miss, Mrs, or Ms  in the data. However, there are certain jockeys without a title. For these we checked
rst names and designated the jockey as a female only after an internet search (involving the British Horse Racing Authority
ite, the Horse Racing Ireland site, the Racing Post site and other Google searches) revealed his or her gender. There were
ome jockeys whose identity was not clear (i.e. listed as ‘Reserve’, for example), and these were left out of the analysis.5
5 We were unable to classify the identity or gender of 1.2% of the participants in our sample. We do not ﬁnd that these unidentiﬁed competitors outperform
r  underperform betting market expectations (with respect to male and female jockeys with similar implied win probabilities), and, further, there is little
n  the literature we  reviewed in Section 2 to suggest that males or females disproportionately play the back-up role of Reserves (who themselves are more
ikely  to be unidentiﬁed in our data-set). We  therefore do not have reason to believe that leaving these competitors out of our analysis affects any inferences
e  draw.
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Table 1
Female participation and percentiles.
All Participation Average percentile Total N
4.75% 59.53 1, 323, 135
Year
2003  4.20% 59.89 111,686
2004  4.65% 59.84 122,260
2005 4.43% 59.40 125,768
2006 4.09% 59.45 126,125
2007  4.20% 61.02 126,882
2008  4.54% 59.02 132,618
2009  4.20% 59.82 126,665
2010  4.83% 59.96 125,077
2011  5.50% 58.69 124,025
2012  6.20% 58.71 118,821
2013  5.75% 59.63 83,208
Class
1  1.16% 63.37 53,941
2  3.05% 62.59 55,667
3  3.21% 61.46 84,949
4  3.23% 62.69 252,420
5  5.75% 61.33 296,886
6  8.99% 59.62 192,544
7 7.48% 58.05 23,851
Race  type
All-weather ﬂat 6.75% 61.75 229,042
Flat  5.62% 61.35 533,701
National Hunt Flat 8.19% 49.43 65,122
Hurdle  2.18% 56.30 322,660
Steeplechase 2.89% 54.63 172,476
Statistics on the participation and the average predicted percentiles of female jockeys in horse races in the U.K. and Ireland from 1st January 2003 to 7th
September 2013 inclusive. Participation is deﬁned as the proportion of rides secured by a female jockey, and predicted percentile is calculated for each
participant in each race. As an example, a jockey/horse predicted to ﬁnish 6th out of 10 runners (by an ordering of his/her odds) would be the classiﬁed as
the  60th percentile. Total N includes all riders, whether male or female. Statistics are displayed for all female riders in the top panel, then broken down by
year,  class (1 top, 7 bottom), and race type in successive panels.
Our designation of jockey gender turned up 1385 females, and 4749 males. This includes amateur jockeys, apprentices (or
conditionals, in jump racing), and professionals. In Table 1 we summarise the participation of women across the full sample,
across years, across classes of race, and across race types. Overall, female participation stands at 4.75% of rides. There is some
evidence that this has increased over the years, going from 4.2% in 2003 to 6.2% in 2012 (the last full year in our sample).
However, female participation does appear to be concentrated in lower-grade races. Females secure 7.48% of rides in class
7, but only 1.16% in the top class races. Finally, females secure a greater number of rides on the ﬂat, particularly in the less
prestigious races on synthetic surfaces (the all-weather ﬂat races), and in national hunt ﬂat races, which are staging posts
for future jump horses. Female participation in jump races is low, with women  securing 2.18% of rides in hurdle races, and
2.89% of rides in steeplechases.
We also calculated the predicted percentile of each jockey in each race, and display the average of this statistic for females
in Table 1. The percentile is calculated by ordering the horses in each race from the favourite to the longest of longshots.
For example, a horse with an SP of 2 is predicted to ﬁnish before a horse with an SP of 4, who is predicted to ﬁnish before a
horse with an SP of 7, and so on. This predicted percentile measure indicates that female jockeys are typically longshots in
races. Female jockeys are, on average, the 59.53rd percentile in races. There is not much evidence that this has changed over
the years, though there is some evidence that women  are more likely to ride favourites in lower class races. The average
female percentile in class 7 races is 58.05, compared to 63.37 in class 1 races. Females are also more likely to ride favourites
in national hunt events (including ﬂat races) compared to all-weather and standard ﬂat races. For example, female jockeys
ride, on average, as the 49.43rd percentile in national hunt ﬂat races.
Our ﬁrst measure of race success is an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse won the race. We  want to compare this
for each implied win probability, which is calculated as 1/SP, where SP is the starting price. The idea behind this measure is
that, in the absence of a bookmaker proﬁt margin and in the case of a risk-neutral representative bettor (more on this in a
moment), all bets would yield an expected return of 0. In other words, the implied win  probability would approximate the
empirical win probability. For example, take a series of horses with SPs of 4. The implied win probability of these horses
would be 1/4 = 0.25. Therefore, such horses should win approximately 1 out of 4 times they run. If the bettor picks up a proﬁt
of 3 GBP for each win, he or she will, in expectation, break even, by losing 1 GBP in each of the other 3 runs. Now, if there
is a positive bookmaker margin, implied win probabilities will actually slightly overestimate empirical win probabilities.
Furthermore, if the representative bettor is risk-loving (or alternatively, risk-averse), we  will observe a positive (negative)
favourite-longshot bias. This is because a risk-loving (risk-averse) bettor is willing to pay a premium, in terms of lower
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xpected returns, in return for betting on a low (high) win  probability horse. We will keep an eye on both of these potential
rictions – the bookmaker margin, and the risk preferences of the representative bettor – in our upcoming empirical analysis.
In Fig. 1 we plot the average race win indicator for each implied win  probability (rounded to 2 decimal places). We
ompare this plot for male jockeys (dots) and female jockeys (diamonds). If women are systematically underestimated, we
hould observe more female dots above the male dots (for any implied win  probability). To put this another way, if the
etting market underestimates female jockeys, a section of female jockeys predicted to win 25% of the time (i.e. with odds
f 4), for example, would actually win 24% of the time, compared to male jockeys with the same odds who  only win  23% of
he time. Such an example allows for a bookmaker proﬁt margin, but implies that the margin would be smaller for female
ockeys if they are underestimated relative to men. Where the data are plentiful (at the lower implied win probabilities),
owever, it would appear that male and female jockeys, with the same odds, win approximately as often as each other. As
e move towards higher implied win probabilities, it is clear that the data for women becomes more noisy. This is due to the
bsence of sufﬁcient female favourites. Nevertheless, there is no clear graphical evidence from the full sample that women
re systematically underestimated relative to men.
The problem with our ﬁrst measure of race success is that it is relatively coarse. All of those that fail to win  the race
eceive the same measure of success: a 0 in the win  indicator column. This ignores potential differences in how each horse
nd jockey performed relative to market expectations. With this in mind, we  also consider the predicted and actual ﬁnishing
ositions of male and female jockeys.
The predicted position is calculated by ordering the horses by their win odds, as with the predicted percentile measure. In
ig. 2 we plot the average actual ﬁnishing position for each predicted ﬁnishing position. Male (female) jockeys are displayed
ig. 2. The average ﬁnishing position of male and female jockeys, plotted for each predicted ﬁnishing position (inferred by an ordering of horses by betting
dds).  Data are taken from horse races in the U.K. and Ireland from 1st January 2003 to 7th September 2013 inclusive, and only the top 20 predicted
ositions are displayed (few races have more than 20 participants).
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with dots (diamonds). We  truncate the analysis at the top 20 predicted positions as few races have more than 20 competitors.
An important thing to note is that, aside from the favourites (who can only underperform), horses that ﬁnish tend to
outperform expectations, simply by ﬁnishing. There are a substantial number of horses that are pulled-up during races (and
therefore do not have a ﬁnishing position). Those that do complete the race, therefore, tend to jump a few places. More
importantly, we ﬁnd little graphical evidence from the full sample that female jockeys outperform expectations in terms
of ﬁnishing position. If female jockeys are systematically underestimated we  would expect to ﬁnd female dots below their
male equivalents (i.e. for each predicted position female jockeys would ﬁnish a rank or two higher). However, there is little
from the plots of the full sample to suggest that there is a such a general underestimation of women.
We intend that our two measures of race success capture female jockey performance relative to expectations in a way
that is intuitive for the industry. With this in mind, consider the following quote regarding a win for Hayley Turner (perhaps
the most famous current female jockey) from the Guardian on 30th April 2008:
‘The few racegoers not swept from the grandstand steps by driving rain at Bath could have found little fault with Turner’s
winning effort on Rose Row in the staying handicap . . . That victory, on the ﬁfth-favourite in a ﬁeld of seven, showed Turner can
make the most of her opportunities.’
Such a performance would show up as 1 in the win  indicator column, on a horse incidentally with a win probability of
only 0.117 (SP of 8.5), and also a ﬁnishing position of 1st despite being ranked 5th prior to the race. This is precisely the
type of outperformance – if replicated for women across the sample – which would indicate a systematic underestimation
of their abilities.
In the same vein is this quote regarding Lucy Alexander, a jump jockey, in the Telegraph on 7th December 2011:
‘Last month she rode three winners in four days and at Musselburgh on Monday she landed her ﬁrst double. Punters will be keen
on her because, to a 1 pound stake, her rides have produced a return of plus 41 pounds this season. Without getting on favourites
she is getting results.’
In other words, in this very small sample, one female jockey is winning substantially more often than her odds would
suggest. In the next section we will formally test whether the market underestimates women across a much larger sample
of women, and across the full 10 years.
5. Analysis
We  begin our analysis by assessing whether female jockeys win races more often than their odds imply. If they do, this
would suggest that the market underestimates their ability to get the best out of their horse. In the ﬁrst column of Table 2,
we regress an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse in question won the race, on the implied win  probability of the
horse (calculated from the starting price), and an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was female. All 1.32 million
observations are included, an OLS speciﬁcation is used, and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at
both the jockey-level and the horse-level. By clustering both at the jockey and horse level – see Cameron et al. (2011) for
the methods used – we allow for error correlations for different jockeys riding the same horse, and also error correlations
for different horses ridden by the same jockey. The OLS model utilised provides easy to interpret coefﬁcients. We would
expect the intercept to be negative to allow for a bookmaker proﬁt margin. Furthermore, in an efﬁcient market (i.e. with no
favourite-longshot bias), we would expect the coefﬁcient associated with implied win  probability to be close to 1.
Examining these results, we ﬁnd that the intercept is indeed negative (−0.15), but that the implied win  probability
coefﬁcient is 0.965, signiﬁcantly different from 1 statistically. This indicates that there is a slight negative favourite-longshot
bias. This means, once you account for the bookmaker margin, in our data longshots (favourites) win  more (less) often than
their odds suggest. (A coefﬁcient above 1 would indicate a positive favourite-longshot bias, where favourites win more often
than their odds suggest. We  will return to this in a moment). Importantly, we ﬁnd that that there is a small signiﬁcant effect
attached to the female jockey indicator. Female jockeys win 0.3% more races than their odds imply. While this effect was
too small to decipher graphically, our regression suggests that female jockeys are slightly underestimated by the betting
market when we consider the full sample.
Returning to the negative favourite-longshot bias, it is possible that the signiﬁcance of the female jockey indicator is in
part due to the fact that females are disproportionately longshots in the races in which they compete (see the percentile
evidence in Table 1). If this is the case, we would be confounding an underestimation of female ability with a general, gender
unrelated, bias in betting prices. One way to examine this possibility is to interact the female jockey dummy  with implied
win probability. If female jockeys appear to be underestimated simply because they are often longshots, then we should
observe that the effect is greatest for female jockeys who have low implied win probabilities. In the second column of the
top panel of Table 2 we present the results of this regression. We  actually ﬁnd that there is greater underestimation of
female ability for favourites (those with high implied win  probabilities), if anything, as shown by the positive coefﬁcient
associated with the interaction term. While the interaction is statistically insigniﬁcant, the female jockey indicator retains
its signiﬁcance at the 10% level. In short, there is slight evidence of female underestimation, in terms of wins, and little of
this appears to be related to any general favourite-longshot bias in betting prices.In the previous section we discussed how measuring a horse’s ﬁnishing position may  be preferable to the win  indicator
measure as it captures ﬁner information about the performance of all horses relative to expectations. In the bottom panel
of Table 2, therefore, we examine how ﬁnishing position varies across jockey gender. We regress ﬁnishing position on the
predicted position of the horse (inferred from an ordering of betting odds), and an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey
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Table  2
Wins and positions (all races).
Dep. var.: race win  indicator All All
Intercept −0.015*** −0.015***
(0.000) (0.000)
Implied Win  probability 0.965*** 0.965***
(0.003) (0.004)
Female jockey 0.003* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Implied win  probability * female jockey 0.006
(0.014)
R2 0.129 0.129
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 6134 6134
No.  of clusters (horses) 114,883 114,883
No.  of observations 1,323,135 1,323,135
Dep.  var.: ﬁnishing position
Intercept 2.624*** 2.623***
(0.024) (0.025)
Predicted position 0.561*** 0.561***
(0.002) (0.002)
Female jockey −0.044 −0.020
(0.049) (0.078)
Predicted position * female jockey −0.003
(0.008)
R2 0.333 0.333
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 5932 5932
No.  of clusters (horses) 111,821 111,821
No.  of observations 1,225,878 1,225,878
Regressions to establish whether female jockeys win  more often than their odds imply, and/or ﬁnish in better positions than the market predicts. In the
top  panel, an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse won  the race, was regressed on the implied win  probability of the horse (deﬁned as 1/SP where SP
is  the starting price), and an indicator equalling 1 if a female jockey rode the horse. In the bottom panel, the ﬁnishing position of the horse was regressed
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in  the predicted ﬁnishing position of the horse (inferred from an ordering of the horses by betting odds), and an indicator equalling 1 if a female jockey
ode  the horse. Interactions were added in the second regressions. An OLS speciﬁcation was  used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered
or  each jockey and each horse) are in parentheses, and ***, * and. indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
iding the horse was female. All observations are included in the regression, though there are only 1.22 million observations
n this regression as certain horses failed to ﬁnish their race. An OLS speciﬁcation is again used, and heteroskedasticity-
onsistent standard errors are clustered at both the jockey and horse level. We  ﬁnd that female jockeys ﬁnish only 0.04
laces higher than the market predicts, a mispricing which is statistically insigniﬁcant. In the second column of the bottom
anel of Table 2, we also interact predicted ﬁnishing position with the female jockey dummy, to ascertain whether there
s a signiﬁcant difference in the mispricing for those predicted to ﬁnish well and those with lesser prospects in the same
ace. We  ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference. To sum up at this stage, while there is a slight underestimation of women  in the full
ample in terms of wins (0.3%), there is little or no effect to be found in terms of placings.
For the remainder of the analysis we will consider a number of sub-samples. Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that discrimination
ccurred in earlier years. The 2000s was an important decade for female participation in horse racing. In 2008, Hayley Turner
ecame the ﬁrst woman to win 100 ﬂat races in a season. This followed her success in 2005, when she was joint Champion
pprentice. It is possible that female ability was underestimated earlier in our sample, before the achievements of this era’s
ost successful female jockey conveyed information to the betting market about the general merits of female jockeys.
With this in mind, in Table 3a we repeat the ﬁrst win indicator regression, but this time break the sample down year
y year. In Table 3b, we conduct a similar exercise by repeating the ﬁnishing position regression for each year. From these
esults, there is little evidence that any bias in beliefs has shifted over the period of our sample. Female jockeys won 0.4%
ore often that their odds suggested in 2012, and gained 0.11 places, on average, relative to expectations in 2011. However,
here is no evidence to suggest that female jockeys were underestimated – either in terms of wins or placings relative to
xpectations – in the early years.
Another hypothesis is that biased beliefs may  be more prevalent (or at least easier to observe) in lower class races. This
ay be due to one of two factors. Firstly, with less money at stake in lower class races, there is arguably less incentive for
ettors (and bookmakers) to acquire detailed information on jockey (and horse) ability. (Information may  also be harder to
btain at the lower end of the sport, as the races and participants have a lower proﬁle.) Secondly, if there is a mispricing (of
hich an underestimation of women is just one example), smaller betting markets are less attractive to arbitrageurs looking
o correct inefﬁciencies. Chordia et al. (2008) present evidence from ﬁnancial markets to suggest that liquidity encourages
rbitrage and market efﬁciency. Without such liquidity in the betting markets on lower class races, we may  be more likely
o observe biased beliefs about female ability.
To this end, in Tables 4a and 4b we repeat the analysis of Table 2, but this time break the sample down by class. (We  lose
ome data as all Irish races, and some U.K. races, do not have a designated class.) The results for the full sample are retained
n these tables for comparison purposes. There is little evidence that females jockeys are underestimated in low class races.
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Table 3a
Wins (year sub-samples).
Dep. var.: race win indicator All 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Intercept −0.015*** −0.019*** −0.016*** −0.016*** −0.016*** −0.016***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Implied win  probability 0.965*** 0.979*** 0.965*** 0.967*** 0.976*** 0.966***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Female  jockey 0.003* 0.005 0.001 0.003 −0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.129 0.144 0.124 0.112 0.128 0.128
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 6134 1772 1710 1658 1753 1811
No.  of clusters (horses) 114,883 23,066 24,537 25,438 26,265 27,036
No.  of observations 1,323,135 111,686 122,260 125,768 126,125 126,882
Dep.  var.: race win indicator 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Intercept −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.014*** −0.013*** −0.014*** −0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Implied win  probability 0.956*** 0.966*** 0.963*** 0.956*** 0.961*** 0.962***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Female  jockey 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.004. 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.124 0.131 0.127 0.130 0.129 0.137
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 1887 1836 1857 1738 1622 1438
No.  of clusters (horses) 28,123 27,250 26,953 25,814 24,760 21,030
No.  of observations 132,618 126,665 125,077 124,025 118,821 83,208
Regressions to establish whether female jockeys win more often than their odds imply, this time looking at racing in different years. An indicator variable
equalling 1 if the horse won  the race, was regressed on the implied win probability of the horse (deﬁned as 1/SP where SP is the starting price), and an
indicator equalling 1 if a female jockey rode the horse. An OLS speciﬁcation was  used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered for each
jockey and each horse) are in parentheses, and *** and. indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, and 10% level respectively. The ﬁrst regression uses data from all
years,  with subsequent regressions breaking the data down year by year.
There is some overestimation of female jockeys in terms of wins (2%) and places (0.32 positions) in class 1 races, but the
effect quickly reverses as female jockeys are underestimated by a larger 0.55 places in class 2 races, which are also elite
events. It is difﬁcult, therefore, to discern any clear pattern between class and female over/under estimation.Our ﬁnal hypothesis relates to race type. As discussed in Section 2, races can be run on the ﬂat and over jumps. Female
participation is much lower in jump racing (hurdles and steeplechases), than it is on the ﬂat (see Table 1). Even within
ﬂat races, there are marked differences in female participation rates. Women get more rides on all-weather tracks and in
Table 3b
Positions (year sub-samples).
Dep. var.: ﬁnishing position All 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Intercept 2.624*** 2.648*** 2.791*** 2.828*** 2.725*** 2.746***
(0.024) (0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.035) (0.034)
Predicted position 0.561*** 0.579*** 0.560*** 0.556*** 0.557*** 0.558***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female  jockey −0.044 0.055 −0.009 0.083 −0.038 0.005
(0.049) (0.108) (0.086) (0.094) (0.097) (0.098)
R2 0.333 0.347 0.323 0.325 0.335 0.339
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 5932 1698 1656 1598 1689 1747
No.  of clusters (horses) 111,821 21,967 23,370 24,422 25,082 25,911
No.  of observations 1,225,878 102,725 112,495 115,881 115,915 117,724
Dep.  var.: ﬁnishing position 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Intercept 2.705*** 2.651*** 2.565*** 2.474*** 2.490*** 2.372***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027)
Predicted position 0.555*** 0.552*** 0.555*** 0.561*** 0.550*** 0.554***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female  jockey −0.087 −0.041 −0.087 −0.110. −0.020 0.013
(0.085) (0.084) (0.078) (0.058) (0.083) (0.067)
R2 0.321 0.303 0.335 0.342 0.328 0.338
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 1801 1768 1787 1698 1564 1396
No.  of clusters (horses) 26,850 26,079 25,897 24,878 23,868 20,300
No.  of observations 122,312 117,427 116,719 115,640 111,132 77,908
Regressions to establish whether female jockeys perform better than the betting market predicts, this time looking at racing in different years. The ﬁnishing
position of the horse, was regressed on the predicted ﬁnishing position of the horse (inferred from an ordering of the horses by betting odds), and an indicator
equalling 1 if a female jockey rode the horse. An OLS speciﬁcation was  used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered for each jockey and
each  horse) are in parentheses, and ***, and. indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, and 10% level respectively. The ﬁrst regression uses data from all years, with
subsequent regressions breaking the data down year by year.
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Table  4a
Wins (class sub-samples).
Dep. var.: race win  indicator All 1 2 3
Intercept −0.015*** −0.010*** −0.010*** −0.009***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Implied win  probability 0.965*** 0.949*** 0.947*** 0.934***
(0.003) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013)
Female  jockey 0.003* −0.020** −0.001 0.007
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.129 0.140 0.096 0.110
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 6134 1127 1482 1776
No.  of clusters (horses) 114,883 15,788 16,743 25,465
No.  of observations 1,323,135 53,941 55,667 84,949
Dep.  var.: race win  indicator 4 5 6 7
Intercept −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.013*** −0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Implied win  probability 0.958*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.977***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.031)
Female  jockey 0.002 0.003 0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
R2 0.138 0.134 0.116 0.094
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 2482 3222 3020 1072
No.  of clusters (horses) 56,610 64,109 45,549 8,608
No.  of observations 252,420 296,886 192,544 23,851
Regressions to establish whether female jockeys win more often than their odds imply, this time analysing different classes of race. An indicator variable
equalling 1 if the horse won the race, was  regressed on the implied win probability of the horse (deﬁned as 1/SP where SP is the starting price), and an
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fndicator equalling 1 if a female jockey rode the horse. An OLS speciﬁcation was used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered for each
ockey and each horse) are in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. The ﬁrst regression uses data
rom  all classes, with subsequent regressions breaking the data down class by class. 1 is the top class, and 7 the bottom.
ational hunt ﬂat races than they do in the classical ﬂat races. It is possible that an underestimation of female ability is in
ome way connected with rates of participation.
With this in mind, in Tables 5a and 5b we repeat the regressions of Table 2, but this time with the sample broken down
y race type. As before, wins are considered in Table 5a, with ﬁnishing position relative to predicted position in Table 5b. For
ins, we ﬁnd above average underestimation for two  of the race types. Female jockeys win  0.7% more hurdle races than the
arket predicts, and 0.9% more steeplechases. Female participation in these two forms of jump racing is low, standing at
.18% and 2.89% for hurdles and steeplechases respectively. A similar, and perhaps more dramatic, picture emerges in terms
able 4b
ositions (class sub-samples).
Dep. var.: ﬁnishing position All 1 2 3
Intercept 2.624*** 2.627*** 3.203*** 2.427***
(0.024) (0.043) (0.082) (0.040)
Predicted position 0.561*** 0.521*** 0.543*** 0.520***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Female  jockey −0.044 0.318** −0.545** 0.252.
(0.049) (0.107) (0.191) (0.129)
R2 0.333 0.327 0.308 0.292
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 5932 1092 1373 1684
No.  of clusters (horses) 111,821 15,092 15,826 23,935
No.  of observations 1,225,878 49,942 52,160 76,436
Dep.  var.: ﬁnishing position 4 5 6 7
Intercept 2.309*** 2.493*** 2.819*** 3.224***
(0.033) (0.023) (0.024) (0.048)
Predicted position 0.549*** 0.550*** 0.535*** 0.487***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Female  jockey −0.033 −0.026 −0.078 0.019
(0.099) (0.045) (0.047) (0.081)
R2 0.330 0.321 0.293 0.253
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 2395 3114 2941 1044
No.  of clusters (horses) 53,696 61,457 44,148 8,181
No.  of observations 226,511 276,808 187,185 22,455
egressions to establish whether female jockeys perform better than the betting market predicts, this time analysing different classes of race. The ﬁnishing
osition of the horse, was regressed on the predicted ﬁnishing position of the horse (inferred from an ordering of the horses by betting odds), and an
ndicator equalling 1 if a female jockey rode the horse. An OLS speciﬁcation was used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered for each
ockey and each horse) are in parentheses, and ***, ** and. indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 1% and 10% level respectively. The ﬁrst regression uses data
rom  all classes, with subsequent regressions breaking the data down class by class. 1 is the top class, and 7 the bottom.
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Table 5a
Wins (race type sub-samples).
Dep. var.: race win indicator All All-weather ﬂat Flat NH ﬂat Hurdle Chase
Intercept −0.015*** −0.013*** −0.014*** −0.017*** −0.017*** −0.016***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Implied win  probability 0.965*** 0.953*** 0.963*** 0.938*** 0.972*** 0.976***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008)
Female  jockey 0.003* −0.001 0.003* −0.003 0.007** 0.009*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
R2 0.129 0.116 0.117 0.141 0.153 0.130
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 6134 1917 3519 2387 2524 2423
No.  of clusters (horses) 114,883 42,357 64,599 30,268 51,040 23,634
No.  of observations 1,323,135 229,042 533,701 65,122 322,660 172,476
Regressions to establish whether female jockeys win  more often than their odds imply, this time analysing different types of races. An indicator variable
equalling 1 if the horse won  the race, was regressed on the implied win probability of the horse (deﬁned as 1/SP where SP is the starting price), and an
indicator equalling 1 if a female jockey rode the horse. An OLS speciﬁcation was  used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered for each
jockey and each horse) are in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. The ﬁrst regression uses data
from  all race types, with subsequent regressions examining all-weather ﬂat racing, ﬂat racing, national hunt ﬂat races, hurdle races, and steeplechases.
Table 5b
Positions (race type sub-samples).
Dep. var.: ﬁnishing position All All-weather ﬂat Flat NH Flat Hurdle Chase
Intercept 2.624*** 2.730*** 2.854*** 2.888*** 2.587*** 2.174***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.044) (0.036) (0.027)
Predicted position 0.561*** 0.535*** 0.569*** 0.606*** 0.557*** 0.425***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female  jockey −0.044 −0.123* −0.100. 0.102 −0.543*** −0.300***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.055) (0.148) (0.090) (0.054)
R2 0.333 0.288 0.322 0.376 0.358 0.269
No.  of clusters (jockeys) 5932 1909 3486 2352 2414 2160
No.  of clusters (horses) 111,821 42,239 64,346 29,681 46,425 19,852
No.  of observations 1,225,878 228,140 530,937 63,232 276,818 126,710
Regressions to establish whether female jockeys perform better than the betting market predicts, this time analysing different types of races. The ﬁnishing
position of the horse, was  regressed on the predicted ﬁnishing position of the horse (inferred from an ordering of the horses by betting odds), and an
indicator equalling 1 if a female jockey rode the horse. An OLS speciﬁcation was  used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered for each
jockey and each horse) are in parentheses, and ***, *, and. indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The ﬁrst regression uses data
from  all race types, with subsequent regressions examining all-weather ﬂat racing, ﬂat racing, national hunt ﬂat races, hurdle races, and steeplechases.
of ﬁnishing positions. Female jockeys ﬁnish, on average, 0.54 places better than predicted in hurdle races, and 0.3 places
better in steeplechases. To put the size of this effect in context, we  recreated Fig. 2 in Fig. 3, but this time only included jump
racing. For almost all predicted ﬁnishing positions displayed, except the favourite, female jockeys outperform their male
equivalents on average. In other words, the predicted placings implied by an ordering of betting market prices underestimate
the abilities of female jockeys in jump racing.
Fig. 3. The average ﬁnishing position of male and female jockeys, plotted for each predicted ﬁnishing position (inferred by an ordering of horses by betting
odds),  this time just for jump racing (hurdles and steeplechases). Data are taken from horse races in the U.K. and Ireland from 1st January 2003 to 7th
September 2013 inclusive, and only the top 20 predicted positions are displayed (few races have more than 20 participants).
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Why  might the underestimation of female jockeys occur in races where female participation is low? To our mind, there
re at least three possible explanations. One possibility is that there is a confounding factor which drives both low rates
f female participation, and a small underestimation of female ability. For example, the physicality of jump racing may
reate the impression that females are unsuitable as jump jockeys (see the discussion in Section 2), and also cause bettors to
nderestimate female ability. In other words, the two  outcomes go hand-in-hand, but are actually caused by a third factor.
nother possibility – and in fact the initial hypothesis in our study – is that low rates of female participation (in the job
arket more generally) are caused by systematic underestimation of female ability. In the case of horse racing, this would
uggest that the betting market reveals a bias in the industry’s beliefs, and it is this bias that leads to low levels of female
mployment in this particular part of the industry. A ﬁnal possibility is that low levels of female participation actually lead to
nderestimation. It is possible that bettors are only able to accurately assess female ability if they receive sufﬁcient signals
egarding the quality of female jockeys. In the absence of enough signals (i.e. enough female jockeys), the betting market
and the industry) continue to hold mistaken beliefs, and, in turn, female participation continues to be low. Without a clean
nstrument – such as the exogeneous imposition of a female quota, for example – we  are unable to distinguish between
hese explanations.
. Conclusion
We  use data from 123,704 horse races spread over more than 10 years to investigate whether society holds biased beliefs
bout the abilities of women. Just as in business, politics and academia, men  and women  compete side-by-side. The difference
n horse racing is that members of the public periodically enter the workplace, and trade bets on the winners and losers. The
rices that result from these bets provide a unique window onto society’s beliefs about female ability in a male-dominated
ccupation. If women are underestimated, we should observe female jockeys winning more often than their odds imply,
nd ﬁnishing races before their more heavily-favoured male peers.
We compare the performance of men  and women – relative to betting market expectations – both in terms of wins and
nal placings. For the full sample, we ﬁnd that the market slightly underestimates women, who win 0.3% more races than
redicted. However, this small effect masks differences across race types. Women are underestimated to a greater extent
n steeplechases – winning 0.9% more races than predicted, and in hurdles – ﬁnishing, on average, 0.54 places higher than
redicted. Both of these are forms of jump racing, where female participation is low.
Nevertheless, we should be cautious in extrapolating these results to other occupations. Male and female jockeys compete
n a largely physical basis, while most gender competition in the workplace involves only mental tasks. In other words,
istake-based discrimination may  not arise in a more typical occupation, where differences between men  and women are
ess obvious. On the other hand, it should be noted that the betting market is an arena where discrimination is uniquely
ostly. If certain bettors discriminate against women, and therefore overbet on male jockeys, their money will be quickly lost.
hat’s more, informed arbitrageurs can step in, bet on female jockeys, and destroy any remnant of the initial discrimination.
t is debatable whether ﬁrms can so easily arbitrage discrimination against women in other workplaces. In other words, if
istake-based discrimination were to arise in other occupations, it may  be more persistent.
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